Although agreeing with R. Lickliter and H. Honeycutt (2003) that evolutionary psychology lacks and should adopt a coherent developmental model to explain how evolved mechanisms become expressed in phenotypes, it is argued that adhering to the principles of developmental systems theory, despite enhancing evolutionary psychology, would not change appreciably its basic focus. The concepts of innateness and modularity, what is inherited and what evolves, as well as the possible role of developmental plasticity in the evolution of human cognition are discussed. It is proposed that evolutionary psychology can incorporate the developmental systems perspective into its theorizing, with the end result being a science that more closely reflects human nature.
The age of genomics began half a century ago with the discovery of the chemical basis of inheritance (Watson & Crick, 1953) . Since that time, knowledge of how genes influence structure and function has grown continuously, culminating in February 2001 with the joint publication of the first "complete" drafts of the human genome by two competing research teams (International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2001; Venter et al., 2001) . Biologists, psychologists, medical professionals, policymakers, journalists, and the public at large all shared in the enthusiasm of this feat of modern science, expressing the belief that the path to perfect knowledge would be through the genes. With respect to psychology, this "genomicophilia" represents a trend beginning in the 1970s of an increasingly gene's-eye view of the "cause" of behavior, displacing the once-entrenched "environmentalism" as the dominant paradigm of modern psychology. Although this is perhaps best seen in the acceptance of behavior genetics as a reputable scientific discipline, it can also be seen in the ascendancy of evolutionary psychology as a respectable topic for study. The problem is, according to Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003) , these gene-based perspectives represent an outdated understanding of how genes produce body, mind, and behavior, resulting, unwittingly, in a form of genetic determinism. These claims could be made equally well against practitioners of either behavior genetics or evolutionary psychology, but it is the latter group that Lickliter and Honeycutt singled out in their article. (See Gottlieb, 1995, and Moore, 2001 , for critiques of behavior genetics from a developmental systems perspective.)
Proponents of contemporary evolutionary psychology understandably balk at the label genetic determinists, insisting that they do not advocate an old-fashioned and wrongheaded form of nativism and that they are explicitly interactionists-but ones who give genetics their proper due when it comes to explaining human behavior. In fact, they point out that evolutionary psychological theorizing is in response to an extreme form of environmentalism that held a stranglehold on the social sciences through much of the middle part of the 20th century (see Pinker, 2002; . Despite such claims, Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003) argued, quoting directly from the major architects of the field, that evolutionary psychologists propose a type of preformationism, with genes doing all the heavy explanatory lifting and the environment merely facilitating or triggering behavioral outcomes. And, in principle, they are right.
Yet, evolutionary psychology is not a simplistic genetic theory of behavior, mindless of environmental or developmental influences in creating phenotypes. It has much to offer modern psychology, including developmental psychology. But development is rarely a major concern of evolutionary psychologists, and my colleagues and I have argued that the field can greatly benefit from a more explicit developmental perspective (e.g., Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000 . I thus applaud Lickliter and Honeycutt's (2003) entry into the fray, opening a dialogue between developmental and evolutionary psychologists. But their criticism, I believe, is too harsh. Much of their critique is based on subtle distinctions in what is inherited and how, and will be misunderstood by many evolutionary psychologists (just as they have misunderstood some of the positions of evolutionary psychology). I fear that rather than beginning a serious dialogue between these camps, the results of their critique will be further polarization. Rather than seeing the adoption of a developmental systems perspective as resulting in the deconstruction of evolutionary psychology, as Lickliter and Honeycutt seemed to argue, I see the adoption of a developmental systems perspective as contributing to the further evolution of evolutionary psychological theory toward a more accurate depiction of human nature. made through psychological mechanisms" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, p. 277) ; what evolved are domain-specific informationprocessing operations, used to solve recurrent problems our ancestors faced in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, usually defined as the Pleistocene, the geological period encompassing approximately the last 2 million years, when Homo sapiens emerged as a species (e.g., Buss, 1995 Buss, , 1999 . Humans, like other species, are prepared by evolution to process some types of information more readily than others (e.g., language) and to solve certain types of problems more easily than others (e.g., social cheating). Stated another way, humans are constrained in how they make sense of their world, with such constraints making it easier to process certain types of information (i.e., enabling constraints; Gelman & Williams, 1998) . I believe that these assertions are generally correct.
Evolutionary psychology takes as a given that Homo sapiens, as all other extant animals, are the product of a long process of evolution, with natural selection being the principal shaping force. Modern humans, however, live in environments far different from the hunter-gatherer ones in which their ancestors evolved; moreover, humans' time as sedentary creatures capable of domesticating plants and animals constitutes only a fraction of the time they have existed as a species (perhaps the last 12,000 years of the 2.5 million years since Homo habilis, the earliest member of the Homo clade, first roamed the earth). Because of this, many of contemporary humans' cognitive and behavioral proclivities, which may have been adaptive in the past, may actually be maladaptive for modern people. As such, evolutionary psychologists look not only at the proximal causes of behavior (e.g., the hormonal basis of sexual attraction), but also the distal causes, usually defined as cognitive mechanisms that led to adaptive behavior in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness. By understanding the distal causes of modern behavior, these behaviors can be better understood, and for some socially maladaptive behaviors, ameliorative solutions proposed. To be amenable to natural selection, adaptive mechanisms must be heritable, and evolutionary psychologists propose that the mechanism of such inheritance is genetic. This gene-based perspective has led to a number of insights about human behavior, including humans' preference for sweets and fats, the basis of incest avoidance, the nature of infant-mother attachment, and different mating strategies for men and women, among many others (see, e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Buss, 1999 The problem with this gene-based approach, however, as Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003) pointed out, is that evolutionary psychology lacks a developmental model to explain how evolved information-processing mechanisms, presumably represented in the genes, get transformed into phenotypes. For example, although it is likely that a preference for sweets and fats signaled a highcaloric meal and was adaptive to our ancestors (and to our ancestors' ancestors), research has clearly shown that an animal's gustatory preferences are influenced by the diet of its mother (e.g., Terry & Johanson, 1996) . In addition, research has shown that sexual aversion for a close relative depends on sharing an early rearing environment (Bevc & Silverman, 2000) , that prenatal experiences can influence the species-typical attachment pattern (e.g., Gottlieb, 1991) , and that prenatal sensory experiences influence postnatal perception (e.g., Foushée & Lickliter, 2002) . Lickliter and Honeycutt provided many more examples of the influence of early (often prenatal) experience on later behavior that is usually conceived as being under genetic control. Development matters, and evolutionary psychologists, for the most part, have not seemed to recognize this.
My guess is that most evolutionary psychologists would respond, "Of course development matters, and we acknowledge this! Evolved mechanisms are not like simple reflexes or instincts but are expressed differently in different environments." In other words, information-processing mechanisms evolved to be sensitive to different environmental contingencies. If Condition A exists, certain genes are activated to produce a particular pattern of behavior; if Condition B exists, other genes are activated (or deactivated) to produce another pattern of behavior better suited to that environment. This is the type of interactionism that Oyama (2001) described as "bloodless" (p. 179), with environments serving as triggers for different sets of genes, which in turn activate the "appropriate" cognitive mechanisms. Psychologists holding a developmental systems perspective see the process much differently, believing that all development is the result of the bidirectional interaction between structure and function at multiple levels of organization, beginning with the genetic and progressing through the cultural. No behavior or cognitive operation (or physical morphology, for that matter) is preformed, waiting only for the proper environment for its activation.
I am first and foremost a developmental psychologist and find myself in basic agreement with Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003) about the nature of ontogeny and the general lack of such a perspective by contemporary evolutionary psychologists. Yet, as I commented above, I am also in basic agreement with the major tenets of evolutionary psychology, believing that the general approach of this discipline will lead to a better understanding of human behavior. Whereas I interpret Lickliter and Honeycutt as arguing that the adoption of a proper developmental model by evolutionary psychologists would result in a science unrecognizable as today's evolutionary psychology, I believe that a rapprochement between contemporary evolutionary psychology and a developmental systems view is possible. Evolutionary psychology needs a developmental model, but the adoption of such a model, despite changing some important aspects of the science, would still preserve its basic core.
Evolutionary Developmental Psychology
My colleagues and I have proposed that the major tenet of evolutionary psychology is that the human mind has been prepared by natural selection, operating over geological time, for life in a human group (e.g., Bjorklund, 1997; Bjorklund & Hernández Blasi, in press; Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000 Geary & Bjorklund, 2000; Hernández Blasi & Bjorklund, 2003) . Within this framework, we define evolutionary developmental psychology as the application of the basic principles of evolution to explain contemporary human development.
It involves the study of the genetic and environmental mechanisms that underlie the universal development of social and cognitive competencies and the evolved epigenetic (gene-environment interactions) processes that adapt these competencies to local conditions; it assumes that not only are behaviors and cognitions that characterize adults the product of selection pressures operating over the course of evolution, but so also are characteristics of children's behaviors and minds. (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002, p. 4) In many ways, this definition fits well with Lickliter and Honeycutt's (2003) perspective. It emphasizes that what evolved are developmental systems (e.g., Gottlieb, 1992) and all this perspective entails in interpreting the origins of adaptive behavior. I concur with Lickliter and Honeycutt that such a perspective is out of the mainstream of contemporary evolutionary psychology and that its adoption requires that practitioners change how they conceptualize cognition and behavior. But, need such a view change drastically how evolutionary psychologists go about their business? Or would the adoption of a developmental model simply refine how evolutionary psychologists do their jobs? The affirmative answer, I believe, is to the latter.
The Phylogeny Fallacy
Most of the criticism Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003) bestowed on evolutionary psychology is related to the phylogeny fallacy (Lickliter & Berry, 1990) , which refers to the assumption "that evolutionary factors are somehow ontologically prior to and more fundamental than proximate factors in directing phenotypic outcomes" (p. 822). The phylogeny fallacy holds "(a) that phylogeny and ontogeny are alternative processes by which information is made available to the developing individual and (b) that specification for an organism's phenotype can exist independently and in advance of its real-time developmental processes" (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003, p. 822) . I concur with Lickliter and Honeycutt that these assumptions are indeed false, and I argue further that they are held implicitly by most evolutionary psychologists. Phylogeny is better viewed as a progression of successive ontogenies, with adult phenotypes emerging through the dynamic interaction of elements in developmental systems, which include the genes but are not limited to them. Such a perspective avoids the pitfall of genetic determinism Lickliter and Honeycutt attributed to evolutionary psychology. Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003) proposed that the phylogeny fallacy, with its attendant genetic determinism, is at the heart of "the most influential idea concerning the nature of human behavior promoted by contemporary evolutionary psychology-that learning and reasoning depend on a battery of evolved, innate mental 'modules' that structure information processing in different cognitive domains" (p. 822), a position they ardently criticized. More specifically, they are concerned with evolutionary psychology's application of the concepts innate, module, and possibly even with evolved.
The Problem With Innateness
The concept of innateness is distasteful to many developmentalists because of the historical and conceptual baggage that comes with it. As usually conceived, it implies "in the genes"-the type of genetic determinism that Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003) inveighed against. But there are other perspectives of innateness, each referring to some inherited disposition in how an animal's brain comes to process certain types of information, and such perspectives, I believe, can be embraced by both evolutionary psychologists and advocates of the developmental systems approach. For example, Elman et al. (1996) proposed three types of innateness, or mental constraints. The first is representational innateness, which refers to "innate knowledge," much as proposed in universal grammar (see Pinker, 1994) , for example; such innate structures reflect a form of genetic determinism, exactly of the type Lickliter and Honeycutt believe is advocated by evolutionary psychologists. The second type is architectural innateness, which refers to the way the brain is organized at birth, with some areas being biased to process some types of information more readily than others (e.g., because of differences in the distribution of neurons, presence of neurotransmitters, connections to other neurons). Thus, there is no innate knowledge, per se, but rather inherited dispositions that become solidified through experience. And a third type, chronotopic innateness, refers to limitations on the developmental timing of events. For example, certain areas of the brain might develop before others. I believe that most forms of innateness (if one must use the term) pertinent to evolutionary psychology are architectural or chronotopic in nature, and as such, the mental processing that results is the product of a dynamic process over the course of ontogeny and not a form of genetic determinism.
Let me provide an example of architectural innateness from research on the development of face processing. Human adults process upright and inverted faces differently, reflected by differences in reaction times and activation of different neural pathways. Such differences are restricted, however, to pictures of individuals from their own species; adult humans show no differential processing, for example, to monkey faces. In comparison, 6-monthold infants process inverted and upright faces differently, but for both human and monkey faces, suggesting that cortical processing of human faces becomes more specialized with age and experience (e.g., Johnson & de Haan, 2001 ). In related research, adults and 9-month-old infants looked longer at novel than familiar human faces but looked equally long at novel and familiar monkey faces. In contrast, 6-month-olds looked longer at novel than familiar faces for both humans and monkeys (Pascalis, de Haan, & Nelson, 2002) . Pascalis et al. (2002) proposed that the ability to perceive faces narrows with development, due in large measure to the cortical specialization that occurs with experience viewing faces. In this view, the sensitivity of the face recognition system to differences in identity among the faces of one's own species will increase with age and with experience in processing those faces. (p. 1321) Such findings are consistent with the position that human infants are born with biases to process some types of information more effectively than others but that such biases become modified with experience (Johnson, 2000; Nelson, 2001 ). Most evolutionary psychologists, I believe, continue to hold that the brain comes equipped with representational and not architectural constraints, and changing their minds otherwise would lead to the acknowledgement that development matters and thus reflect a major and much needed change in the discipline. However, it would not alter greatly, I argue, the main goal of evolutionary psychology: the explanation of human behavior in terms of evolved cognitive mechanisms.
What's Inherited and What Evolved?
Lickliter and Honeycutt might argue that even architectural constraints represent a form of genetic determinism, that even these biases developed and are not the simple products of the reading of a genetic blueprint. True enough. But the fact that these biases emerge in virtually the same form and at the same time for most members of the species suggests a conservative inheritance. What is inherited, however, are not just genes but also environments, or developmental systems, that are highly similar for all members of the species. Organisms inherit not only a speciestypical genome but also a species-typical environment (or speciestypical developmental systems). Adopting such a perspective would necessarily change the way evolutionary psychologists think, but I do not believe it would change their stripes. This new view of inheritance may replace the old one, but it would still be used in the service of explaining the nature of evolved (and inherited, but from a broader perspective) cognitive mechanisms. Lickliter and Honeycutt's (2003) arguments against modularity-the proposal that the human mind/brain is composed of sets of domain-specific operations evolved to deal with a narrow range of problems-is directly related to their belief that such modules imply a form of genetic determinism. (I should comment that this central dogma of evolutionary psychology has also been questioned from within the field; the degree to which adapted mechanisms are domain-specific or domain-general in nature is arguable [see, e.g., Geary & Huffman, 2002] , as is how specific a process must be before it is called domain specific.) But it is not modularity, per se, that gave rise to Lickliter and Honeycutt's ire but the preformationism that is implicitly implied. Again, adopting a developmental systems view would eliminate the specter of preformationism, but it would not necessarily eliminate the concept of mental modules or the fact that they evolved. Now, instead of inheriting genes specifying mental modules, individuals would inherit dynamic developmental systems. Such modules, seen as typifying all of Homo sapiens, would still be seen by evolutionary psychologists as the product of millions of years of natural selection. This, in fact, is a point made by Tooby and Cosmides in discussing development from an adaptationist perspective in their seminal 1992 chapter: "It is this developmentally relevant environment-the environment as interacted with by the organismthat, in a meaningful sense, can be said to be the product of evolution, evolving in tandem with the organism's organized response to it" (p. 84).
Arguments Against Modularity
It will likely matter little at the level of analysis with which most evolutionary psychologists are concerned whether what is inherited are genes or developmental systems, so long as the product (adapted behavior) can be seen as fitting with the basic tenets of Darwin's idea of natural selection: that there be (or was at one time) variability in behaviors, differential survival and/or reproduction of those individuals possessing the behaviors, and that the behaviors are heritable. The distinction between preformed and developed mental operations (regardless of their degree of specificity) is important to developmental psychologists, and it should also be to evolutionary psychologists. However, although such a realization will change the rhetoric of some evolutionary psychologists, it need not alter their primary focus.
What Will Change and What Will Stay the Same?
What in evolutionary psychology will change and what will stay the same by adopting a developmental systems perspective? First and foremost what would change is the taint of genetic determinism, which most practitioners in the field believe they have already left behind. With this, they must change the notion that environments simply trigger genes or that genes "allow environmental influences on phenotypic development" (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003, p. 821) . These are significant changes but ones that would put the discipline in step with the findings from contemporary developmental biology. Moreover, I do not think that this will be a large step for most evolutionary psychologists to make, for when they do focus on development, they often say the right things. Again, from Tooby and Cosmides (1992) :
By changing either the genes or the environment any outcome can be changed, so the interaction of the two is always part of every complete explanation of any human phenomenon. As with all interactions, the product simply cannot be sensibly analyzed into genetically determined and environmentally determined components or degrees of influence. For this reason, everything, from the most delicate nuance of Richard Strauss's last performance of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony to the presence of calcium salts in his bones at birth, is totally and to exactly the same extent genetically and environmentally codetermined. "Biology" cannot be segregated off into some traits and not others. (pp. 83-84) Despite changes, evolutionary psychology would retain much of what makes it a recognizable field. Its focus on interpreting the behavior of modern humans as the product of mechanisms that were adaptive to their ancestors and selected over the course of evolution will remain. Humans (and all other animals) are indeed constrained in what and how they can process information, and they are prepared by years of evolution to process some information more readily than other information. But prepared is not preformed. Enabling constraints develop in each generation, are influenced by prenatal as well as postnatal environments, and reflect the inheritance of developmental systems, not just genes. Such inheritance is conservative over generations, permitting the prediction of behavior, at the species level, that evolutionary psychologists are accustomed to making. Evolutionary psychology can live with such interpretations and still retain its core perspective.
Natural Selection as the Creative Force of Evolution
Central to evolutionary psychology, and to traditional neoDarwinian views of evolution, is the contention that natural selection is the principal mechanism in the generation of novelty. That is, natural selection is the creative force in evolution. However, just as recent findings in developmental and evolutionary biology are questioning the place of genes as the sole source of biological inheritance (see, e.g., Jablonka, 2001; Raff, 1996) , so too is natural selection being questioned as the most important mechanism in creating evolutionary novelty (e.g., Gould, 2002; Oyama, Griffiths, & Gray, 2001) . And, coupled with the belief that more is inherited (and evolves) than just genes, this results in a perspective that is quite different from the one held by today's evolutionary psychologists.
As proposed by Gottlieb (1992 Gottlieb ( , 2002 and others (see Oyama et al., 2001) , epigenetic theories of evolution hold that changes in developmental systems are responsible for generating the novel phenotypes that must then pass through the sieve of natural selection. Natural selection retains its role as the gatekeeper of evolutionary change, but its role is one of eliminating phenotypes that do not fit well with local environments, not as the generator of novelty. Rather, that role goes to changes in developmental systems, particularly changes in behavior influenced by novel responses to changing environments, with genetic changes sometimes following behavioral and morphological changes (see Gottlieb, 1992) . This is not the place to expand on these approaches and to convince skeptical readers that such views do not constitute Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics. These approaches follow naturally from the tenets of developmental systems theory and are among the most difficult concepts to get across to nondevelopmentalists. Furthermore, they are of potential relevance to evolutionary psychologists, in that cognitivebehavioral changes in Homo sapiens' ancient ancestors may have contributed to the evolution of the modern human mind.
Let me mention briefly a line of research from my lab that I believe is pertinent to this issue. Humans last shared a common ancestor with chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) 5-7 million years ago. Although there is much speculation about the factors that prompted members of the Homo line to evolve in a different way than members of the Pan line (e.g., Humphrey, 1976; Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000; Potts, 1998) , true experimentation to test these various hypotheses is not possible. But one hypothesis, that developmental plasticity may have contributed to changes in cognitive functioning, can be examined, at least indirectly, by rearing chimpanzees-as stand-ins for what our common ancestors may have been like-much as human children are reared. Will a species-atypical rearing environment yield a species-atypical developmental trajectory, one that is more in line with that of human children than with that of mother-reared chimpanzees? This has been termed the enculturation hypothesis (Call & Tomasello, 1996) , and it is understandably controversial. Although there is no evidence that human rearing changes chimpanzees' cognition about physical-logical relations (see Langer, Rivera, Schlesinger, & Wakeley, 2003) , there is some evidence that it produces more humanlike functioning for certain types of social cognition (see Bjorklund & Bering, 2003; Bjorklund & Rosenberg, in press; Call & Tomasello, 1996) . For example, my colleagues and I have investigated deferred imitation of actions on objects in enculturated (human-reared) chimpanzees Bjorklund, Yunger, Bering, & Ragan, 2002) . Whereas mother-reared chimpanzees show little evidence of deferred imitation (Tomasello, SavageRumbaugh, & Kruger, 1993) , we and others (i.e., Bering et al., 2000; Tomasello et al., 1993) have found significant levels of deferred imitation in enculturated chimpanzees, even in a situation in which the animals must generalize their actions to slightly different objects . Although interpretations of enculturation studies must be viewed with caution, they suggest that developmental plasticity in humans' common ancestor with modern chimpanzees could have contributed to social-cognitive evolution and that such plasticity may provide "an experiential vehicle by which our hominid ancestors (using contemporary great apes as a model) could have begun to modify their cognition in the direction that resulted in Homo sapiens" (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002, p. 112) . This is a perspective consistent with the developmental systems approach advocated by Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003) and one that should be considered by evolutionary psychologists.
Conclusion
I consider myself to be a proselytizer of both the developmental systems approach and evolutionary psychology, which means I have had to learn to live with contradictions. Evolutionary psychology, I believe, provides a big-picture view of human behavior, applying the dominant theory of biology to explain psychological life. However, in doing so it has often neglected development, as Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003) so cogently pointed out. Evolutionary psychology cannot simply adopt a developmental systems perspective without making substantial-some would say radical-changes to its fundamental base. But I believe there is nothing inherent in a developmental systems view of life that is incompatible with an evolutionary approach to human behavior. In acknowledging that development and evolution proceed as a result of the bidirectional interaction at all levels of biological organization and that animals inherit species-typical environments as well as species-typical genomes, evolutionary psychologists must necessarily modify their views of what is inherited and how. But the ideas that the modern human mind evolved to handle problems faced by our ancestors in ancient environments, that it is information-processing programs that evolved, that there are constraints in what and how people process information, and that such a perspective can facilitate understanding of contemporary human functioning, will not change. Rather, applying a developmental model to evolutionary psychology will only serve to increase the validity of the perspective.
